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RESPONSE TO JUDGE WENDELL
GRIFFEN
JOAN B. GOTrSCHALL*
I want to express my appreciation to Judge Griffen for his
thoughtful and insightful exploration of our topic. As a
nonacademician who struggles with the language of academic discourse,
it was delightful to encounter such a clear and straightforward
exposition of these issues. While I disagree with some of Judge
Griffen's conclusions, I can do so only because he articulated so clearly
and honestly the difficulties this topic presents.
There is much in Judge Griffen's presentation I wholeheartedly
endorse. I agree that no thoughtful judge decides cases in which the
result is not dictated by precedent or statutory language without taking
into account, at some level, deeply personal and frequently religiously-
based views about human and societal good. As a trial judge, I would
go a bit further. In the vast generality of cases, those that do not
present hard issues of first impression about what the law should be, our
personal moral views also come to bear. When I, as a trial judge, must
decide whether a contract should be enforced over claims of fraud or
overreaching, or when I must decide whether a confession should or
should not be suppressed because of the conduct of the police in dealing
with a suspect, I must first determine and describe what happened,
based on my interpretation of the testimony and other evidence before
me. This act of interpretation is influenced by deeply held beliefs about
how human beings do and should behave in their dealings with one
another. These beliefs influence, to some degree, which accounts of the
facts I will believe and which I will not believe, and what facts I will
select for emphasis. My moral beliefs are part of a stew of factors that
unavoidably underlie my decisions.
I believe all judges act this way, whether they consider themselves
religious or not. Martha Nussbaum, whom I understand does not
consider herself a religious writer, suggests that there is an idea of
"human flourishing" which we can think about without any religious
referent; her model of a person who taught us to judge with this concept
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in mind was Walt Whitman, someone who was neither a judge nor, as
far as I am aware, a churchgoer.!
Where I disagree with Judge Griffen is in his assertion that it is
appropriate to include religious sources when we justify our decisions,
and that our failure to do so amounts to concealment. While we
certainly have a right to use religious sources as justification, I believe it
is inappropriate and imprudent to do so. To explain why I feel this way,
I must explain my view of the proper role of courts and judges in our
society.
Courts are imperfect institutions, staffed by judges who are
imperfect creatures with imperfect knowledge and wisdom, trying to
make judgments based on the testimony and records of imperfect
witnesses. As a result, judicial decisions are likely from time to time to
be wrong. They may be wrong because the judge makes the wrong
decision on who is lying and who is telling the truth; they may be wrong
because the judge's assessment of the weight of the evidence is flawed,
in that he or she gives undue emphasis to some facts and too little
weight to others, thereby arriving at a distorted view of what happened;
they may be wrong because the judge misinterprets or misapplies the
law.
People who bring cases to court are engaged in what is frequently
very hostile conflict. These people may believe, correctly or incorrectly,
that the decision in their case is wrong; approximately 50% of them in
every case are very likely to reach that conclusion. Nevertheless, the
judge's job, as I see it, is to direct a resolution that will appear
sufficiently reasonable to both sides that even if they believe the judge
is wrong, they will consent to cease their conflict. We all know of cases
where the judge failed in this undertaking. We know of cases where
disappointed litigants resorted to violence. We also know of cases, like
the recently famous incident involving Judge Harold Baer in New York,
where a party's dissatisfaction with the result in a case led to national
political conflict.
Pursuant to my philosophy of judging, I work hard to try to avoid
such incidents. My goal is to come up with results which leave both
sides feeling that they have been sensitively and respectfully heard and
that my decision is fully justified by those texts accepted as
authoritative in the law. I do not want the parties to experience my
decision as an idiosyncratic expression of my particular personality or
background or to worry that the result would have been different if they
1. See MARTHA NUSSBAUM, POETIC JUSTICE 79-83,86-88 (1995).
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had pulled another name in the judge lottery when they filed their case.
I am required to state reasons for my decisions in order to demonstrate
that my decisions are grounded in, and can be justified by, the evidence
before me and recognized sources of legal authority. If people do not
perceive my rulings as fair, by which I mean sensitive to all the issues
and interests at stake, and if they do not perceive them to be grounded
in authority, they will, I believe, be less likely to accept the ruling as a
resolution to their conflict.
Religion is a flash point for controversy and disagreement. Scholars
like Stephen Carter argue that this ought not to be so, but their
arguments do not alter the reality. The history of human civilization is
littered with horrors inflicted on minorities in the name of religion.
Even in our own country, which is criticized with some basis for being
paranoid about the possibility that some public act will "establish"
religion, the majority's hostility or insensitivity to the minority
routinely causes substantial injury. Anyone who denies this fails to hear
the voices and feel the pain of those whose consciences bring them into
conflict with prevailing mores.
I love Judge Griffen's point that we as judges must be open to all
knowledge, from whatever source or discipline. As judges in a country
committed to religious pluralism, that means to me that we must hear
the voice of the dissenter as respectfully as we hear all other voices.
That means justifying a decision in terms that the dissenter can access
and assent to as fully as anyone else. Insofar as we are unwilling or
unable, as sometimes happens, to do this, I believe we are weakening
the consensus that allows our judicial system to fulfill its responsibility
to our society.
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